Corporate Governance and ERM for SMEs Viability in Italy by Riva, Patrizia et al.
Selection of our books indexed in the Book Citation Index 
in Web of Science™ Core Collection (BKCI)
Interested in publishing with us? 
Contact book.department@intechopen.com
Numbers displayed above are based on latest data collected. 
For more information visit www.intechopen.com
Open access books available
Countries delivered to Contributors from top 500 universities
International  authors and editors




the world’s leading publisher of
Open Access books







Corporate Governance and ERM 
for SMEs Viability in Italy
Patrizia Riva, Maurizio Comoli and Ambra Garelli
Abstract
Family Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (Family SMEs) in Italy have been 
asked by the new Insolvency and Crisis Code (IC-Code) to establish organizational, 
management and accounting bodies and tools appropriate to their nature and size. 
They need to be able to face early warning of company’s crisis and potential loss of 
going concern and to be able to implement strategies provided by the law to recover 
viability. The peculiarity of the Italian System is the joint existence of two levels of 
controls. A “downstream” one carried out by Auditors in charge of the accounting 
control and an “upstream” one carried out by the Supervisory Board in charge for 
the surveillance of directors’ behaviour. The board of statutory auditors (Collegio 
Sindacale), which has been defined as the watchdog distinguishing Italian corporate 
governance system, plays a fundamental role in reaching the goal. Its supervisory 
activities are played ex-ante over directors and are set with independence and 
competence. Auditors, instead, operate when everything has already been decided 
or even implemented concentrating on the accounting issues. The IC-Code sets 
up new corporate governance rules for a huge number of Family SMEs requir-
ing the appointment of independent control bodies, Board of Statutory Auditors 
and Auditors and demanding therefore for more attention to risk monitoring and 
managing.
Keywords: viability, going concern, corporate governance, board of statutory 
auditors (Collegio Sindacale), auditors, internal audit, ERM, ESG risks, overlapping, 
insolvency directive (Directive EU 2019/1023), IC-code, Italy, early warning system, 
SMEs, family firm
1. Introduction
In the current scenario Covid-19 pandemic has undermined many Family Small 
and Medium-sized Enterprises (Family SMEs) viability. Those entities are charac-
terised by few formalisms and important decisions are mainly in the family hands. 
This can represent an important element of weakness and can lead to situations 
of serious difficulty both for the family, which increasingly finds itself having to 
guarantee company commitments with its personal assets, and for the workers who 
risk being overwhelmed by the consequences of an unmanaged crisis [1, 2]. The 
work focuses on factors crucial to preserve going concern and to be able to intercept 
the signs of the crisis well in advance presenting the “italian way”. Companies urge 
to be able to face early warning of financial distress and to implement strategies 
provided by the law to recover viability [3, 4]. The new Italian Insolvency and Crisis 
Code (IC-Code) tries to answer those needs requiring Family SMEs to implement 
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external and independent control systems that make it possible to identify the 
major risks and to deal with them in time and in a more rational way.
Some of these tools are known internationally – such as the introduction of 
compulsory audits - while others are typical of the Italian national Corporate 
Governance system. The peculiarity of the Italian System is the joint existence of 
two levels of controls. A “downstream” one carried out by Auditors in charge of the 
accounting control and an “upstream” one carried out by the Supervisory Board in 
charge for the surveillance of directors’ behaviour. The last is the Board of Statutory 
Auditors (Collegio Sindacale) which has been defined as the watchdog distinguish-
ing Italian corporate governance system. It plays a fundamental role in reaching the 
goal as its supervisory activities are played ex-ante over directors and are set with 
independence and competence. Auditors, instead, operate when everything has 
already been decided or even implemented concentrating on the accounting issues. 
The relevance of these two different roles is the subject of further study in the first 
part of the work, where, after having better defined SMEs viability, the two levels of 
controls are analysed and compared.
The appointment of independent control bodies required by the IC-Code entails 
the need for companies to pay greater attention to identifying risks and to monitor-
ing and managing them. This is particularly true for family SMEs in which we often 
navigate on sight and strategies selection is based more on the entrepreneurial 
instinct of the founder and the family than on a structured analysis of what exists 
and possible options for the future. The second part of the work explores the theme 
on the Internal Control (IC) and Risk Management System (ERM). In this context a 
focus on ESG risk is proposed.
2. SMEs viability
Suitable corporate governance is a fundamental prerequisite for maintaining 
business viability as it allows mapping and a greater awareness of risk management 
which structurally characterise the corporate context, so they can be understood 
at an early stage to seek to prevent and if necessary deal with crisis factors [5]. It is 
important to note that the concept of business viability is formulated and central to 
Directive (EU) 2019/1023, most commonly known as the Insolvency Directive, and 
is specified as a distinctive concept (there is an explicit introduction to the concept 
of a “viability test”) to define and rank companies in order to assess their resilience 
and ability to deal with issues while also finding sustainable solutions to them [6].
The issue of setting up appropriate organisational structures, i.e. the implemen-
tation of a corporate governance model which is consistent and proportionate to 
the business reality, is a particularly sensitive one in the case of family SMEs [7]. In 
these companies, the formalisation of decision-making processes is often seen as 
dispossession and a way to reduce the family’s decision-making powers [8–12]. In 
the world of SMEs, there is a widespread belief that the idea of control systems and 
the professional contribution of administrative- and control-type skills is only a 
cost and not, on the contrary, an important support to achieve objectives [13]. The 
widespread style of entrepreneurship that characterises the Italian productive sec-
tor, but also of many other countries, leads to the existence of a very high number 
of small businesses typically run by one or a small number of people who over time 
identify completely with the company they founded, thus becoming themselves the 
absolute centre of their entrepreneurial creature. It’s a business governance model 
that often struggles to change even when the business gains market recognition and 
thus the size of the company grows at the same pace as the complexity which is to 
be managed [14]. The fear of opening up their management model and listening to 
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instructions from others who introduce new and different skills in many cases wins 
out, despite the numerous external stimuli [15].
With the introduction in the Italian legislation of the Insolvency and Crisis Code 
(IC-Code) [16], which will coincide with the timelines indicated in the Insolvency 
Directive, but which precedes it in terms of its conception, the issue of “organisa-
tional structures” is highlighted for all companies including SMEs [17]. It introduces 
in particular a modification of the law which “requires entrepreneurs to establish an 
appropriate organisational, management and accounting structure proportionate to 
the nature and size of the company, which would also pursue the timely detection of 
a company crisis and the loss of going concern, as well as to take immediate action 
to adopt and implement one of the instruments provided for by the law to overcome 
the crisis and recover viability”.
The legislation underlines and strengthens the tasks and duties which already 
existed in the Italian Civil Code and codes of conduct issued by professional 
organisations. But the most significant feature in the legislation is the obligation to 
appoint supervisory and audit bodies in SMEs, which to date had only been touched 
on marginally on the issue of governance. In particular, the acknowledgment of the 
control role of the Board of Statutory Auditors – a characteristic figure in the Italian 
context - and that of Auditors through the significant widening of the range of 
companies required to appoint them, is undoubtedly revolutionary. The compulsory 
introduction of independent professionals should lead, as a consequence, especially 
in family businesses, as most Italian companies are, on the one hand to a greater 
focus on processes and on the other hand to a more regular reporting of company 
figures and a more formal implementation of budgeting and planning systems.
3. The role of the board of statutory auditors
In order to protect stakeholders, the Board of Statutory Auditors manages an 
extensive system of controls related to, first of all, compliance with the reference 
standards for the preparation of financial statements and, second, compliance with 
the law and the Articles of Association [18]. Of particular importance is overseeing 
the timely implementation of mandatory requirements in the event of significant 
losses, such as to jeopardise business viability [19]. Originally, the “control of the 
financial statements” was included tout court among the duties of the Board of 
Statutory Auditors pursuant to Article 2403 of the Italian Civil Code; subsequently, 
this concept was replaced by the “audit”, understood as a function distinct from 
overseeing. The Board of Statutory Auditors may also perform the audit, but only in 
smaller companies and only if the Board is composed of auditors who are members 
of the appropriate register. Above all, however, in a situation of going concern, it is 
the responsibility of the Board of Statutory Auditors to monitor the conduct of the 
directors. They therefore check if there is an effective dashboard of indicators and 
if it is reliable and if it can therefore allow them, among other things, to monitor the 
risks taken by the company, the actual and projected performances. It is indeed nec-
essary for the Board of SA to calculate with constant frequency the parameters and 
thresholds identified in the new IC-Code to check if there are signs of the beginning 
of a crisis phase and a risk for company viability.
It is worth noting that statutory auditors are professionals who act autonomously 
and independently, including vis-à-vis the shareholders who elected them. The 
Board of Statutory Auditors verifies compliance with its independence both after 
its appointment and annually thereafter, reporting its findings to the Board of 
Directors. They accept the appointment when they judge that they can devote 
the necessary time to the diligent performance of their duties, as required by the 
Risk Management
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2020 Italian Corporate Governance Code. It is in fact a challenging position the 
performance of which, in addition to their skills, requires to play a number of tasks. 
An indispensable component of their work is, therefore, a commitment and the 
possibility of taking part in the activities of the Board of directors and, if they have 
been appointed, of the committees (i.e.: Control and Risk Committee) set up within 
it and of interacting with the other key players in corporate governance, including 
Auditors and the Internal Auditor, who, when appointed, is responsible for setting 
up and monitoring the Internal Control and ERM system. The remuneration of the 
statutory auditors is commensurate with their skills, competence, the commitment 
required and the size and sector characteristics of the company. As for all inde-
pendent auditors, it must be determined ex-ante by the shareholders’ meeting and 
cannot be changed for the duration of the mandate [20].
For the system to work, a significant and structured dialogue among the 
parties involved in the process [21] must be developed, which should ideally 
take place: a) on a daily basis among the directors, the managers and the Internal 
Auditor; and b) periodically, but not intermittently, between these parties - in 
particular the directors appointed in the Control and Risk Committee and the 
Internal Auditor - and the corporate control bodies that is the Board of Statutory 
Auditors (or the Sole Statutory Auditor in case of sitting alone appointment).
The 2020 Italian Corporate Governance Code devotes space to the issue of 
coordination among control bodies. In particular it establishes that the Board of 
Directors shall define the principles concerning coordination and information flows 
among the various entities involved in the internal control and the risk management 
system in order to maximize the efficiency of the system itself, reduce activities 
duplication and ensure effective conduct of the tasks of the control bodies. As part 
of their activities, the Statutory Auditors may ask the internal Auditor to carry out 
checks on specific areas or corporate operations [20]. Moreover, the law provides 
that the Board of Statutory Auditors and Auditors must promptly exchange infor-
mation related to the performance of their respective duties.
The Board of Statutory Auditors has the fundamental function of a communica-
tions hub as it manages and drives information flows to ensure their efficient cir-
culation and to oversee the timely identification of any threats to business viability 
[17]. The Board of Statutory Auditors is, in fact, the central hub in the information 
flow system; it simultaneously plays the role of “recipient, researcher and source of 
information” [22]. The law establishes the obligation of the Board of Directors to 
report to the Board of Statutory Auditors at least quarterly in listed companies and 
at least every six months in unlisted companies, with an initial flow of information 
which is essential for the effective performance of the control functions over the 
administration. The Board of Statutory Auditors, however, is the recipient of a more 
complex information flow, i.e. not only “downstream” from the Board of Directors 
but also “upstream” due to the information flows coming from the auditors and 
from the internal audit function. On its own initiative, it can also set in motion 
information channels to obtain the information needed for the exercise of its 
supervisory function [23]. It thus assumes in fact the function of coordinator of the 
numerous players in the system of internal corporate controls.
4. The role of auditors
During the year, the auditor verifies that the accounts are duly kept and the 
company’s transactions in the book entries are recorded properly. To do this, they 
collect evidence related to the transactions and compare it with the contents of 
the financial statements [17]. In their report, they illustrate the findings of their 
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checks and express their professional opinion. The audit report is related to actual 
accounting documents, i.e. the financial statements and the consolidated financial 
statements, if they have been prepared. It also contains the auditor’s conclusions 
on the existence of going concern, indicating any uncertainties related to events or 
circumstances that may give rise to significant doubt, but this is done only with the 
precise purpose of assessing the fairness of the criteria used to prepare the financial 
statements figures.
Auditor functions are, therefore, limited to expressing a professional opinion 
on the fairness of the financial statements, and comply with auditing standards 
published in the European Union Official Journal. The functions are in no way com-
parable to the supervisory functions attributed to the Board of Statutory Auditors 
by the Italian Civil Code. Specifically, the auditor – unlike the Board of Statutory 
Auditor – does not participate in Board of Directors meetings and does not oversee 
the directors behaviours, nor the appropriate organizational, management and 
accounting structures and tools. Such as appropriateness – or even existence - of 
the internal control system and the corporate risk mapping system. The auditor 
cannot express an opinion on the interim accounting situation. The auditor does 
not assume the role of a corporate information “hub”, but rather contributes as a 
supplier of specific information only on the accounting figures already processed. 
In short, the auditor’s checks are ex-post on the actual accounting documents pre-
pared by the company, while the Board of Statutory Auditors oversight role is more 
complex, in that it is an ex-ante systemic guarding role and it works from a forward 
looking perspective.
5.  The Internal Auditor (IA) and the Internal Control (IC) and Risk 
Management System (ERM)
The Internal Control (IC) and Risk Management System (ERM) consists of the 
processes executed by the Board of directors, managers and other corporate struc-
ture entities to: i) provide a reasonable assurance on the reliability of the financial 
statement figures; ii) achieve compliance with organisational conduct, i.e. compli-
ance with the law and regulations in force; and iii) achieve greater awareness of 
business risks and allow continuity in achieving operational efficacy and efficiency 
objectives [17]. The Internal Control and Risk Management System is basically 
represented by the lines of action and by the control and procedure system adopted 
by the management to achieve the efficient and orderly conduct of corporate 
activities basing choices on reliable data and consciously monitoring the important 
risks. The internal control system must be seen as the process put in place by the 
company to achieve a reasonable assurance that the corporate goals will be achieved. 
It supports the company in identifying and analysing the risks connected to achiev-
ing those goals. It allows management to stay focused on the business and achieve 
its objectives in compliance with the regulations. It is, in short, made up of the 
rules, procedures and organisational structures aimed at allowing the identification 
measurement, management and constant verification of the main company risks.
More specifically – focusing on the issue of risk and therefore on the Enterprise 
Risk Management model – it ensures that the directors have activated an appropri-
ate process to define business and governance objectives which are consistent with 
the corporate mission and are in line with the levels of risk appetite (i.e. with the 
overall exposure to risk the organisation is willing to accept) and acceptable risk 
(satisfactory residual risk after mitigation measures of the individual risk situa-
tions). It is divided into three phases: identification of the events, risk assessment 
and identification of response to the risk itself. The ERM supports the organisation 
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in identifying the risks associated with the adopted strategy and, if necessary, 
alternative strategies. In assessing the potential risks that can arise from a specific 
strategy, the underlying critical assumptions are considered. The risk management 
process monitors and provides valuable information on changes in the assumptions 
and their effect of achieving the strategy. Pursuing every strategy entails risk that 
can change depending on the context dynamics. At times the risk is so important 
that an organisation may want to review the strategy chosen or possibly replace it 
with another one characterised by a more appropriate risk profile.
In most Italian family SMEs – but not only Italian ones –, the system 
described above is not implemented at all, or its implementation is insufficient or 
self-referential.
In this regard, the introduction of the IC-Code represents a considerable element 
of discontinuity because obliging significant external controls on these entities 
means forcing these entities to put their administrative and accounting processes 
in order or strengthen them. Undoubtedly, in many cases this cannot but lead to 
a greater focus on the internal control system, and therefore to the introduction 
in their staff of internal – or even outsourced figures initially – figures with skills 
typical of Internal Auditors.
The introduction of a risk mapping and assessment process takes on particular 
relevance in small and medium enterprises as it allows them to make more informed 
decisions. In fact, the risks identified must be analysed and acknowledged in terms 
of importance, thus allowing management to focus on those that have a higher 
future probability of occurring and which thus have a greater impact. This also 
allows enterprises to identify responses which are more structured and not random 
ones to each identified risk. A risk can be accepted if it is in line with the sustainable 
risk, or can be avoided by, say, transferring it to third parties through an insurance 
policy, or even reduced with interventions using the internal control system or, 
finally, shared through partnership agreements to reduce the impact in the event a 
negative event occurs.
What should be noted is the fact that the proper operation of the Internal 
Control (IC) and Risk Management System (ERM) involves several corporate 
governance parties (Figure 1) [20].
The first party in the system is the Board of Directors, which has an interest in 
basing its decisions on robust data. To best achieve this purpose, it is useful that a 
Control and Risk Committee composed of non-executive and independent direc-
tors (IA) is identified within the board itself when possible and considering the size 
of the board in an SME, with the task of supporting, with appropriate preliminary 
activities, the Board of Directors assessments and decisions. Tailoring the issue to 
Figure 1. 
Map of relevant administration and control roles in a going concern situation.
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family SMEs we can say that the simple introduction of a sole independent director 
in SMEs can have a considerable impact in this regard.
Secondly, especially in cases where it is not possible to set up committees 
within the Board of Directors, the figure of the Internal Auditor (IA) is primary. 
Once identified, he or she assumes a central role in the internal control process as 
the main person responsible for the implementation, operation and monitoring 
of the system itself. He or she must be included in the company’s organisational 
chart, directly under the Board of Directors as it reports directly to the Board and 
is responsible for verifying that the Internal Control (IC) and Risk Management 
System (ERM) is appropriate and that, consequently, the accounts and the informa-
tion made available in general are complete and reliable. As mentioned above, it is 
precisely this figure that, in our opinion, will take on significantly greater impor-
tance with the introduction of the new IC-Code regulations.
Thirdly, of course, the Board of Statutory Auditors is an active party in the 
Internal Control and Risk Management System, albeit with a different vantage 
point, namely with a senior role within the control system. As mentioned above, 
the Board of Statutory Auditors oversees the appropriateness of the organisational 
structures and therefore also the effectiveness of the internal control and ERM by 
interfacing with the Board and the Internal Auditor. It should be underlined that 
this role is explicitly recognised in new 2020 Italian Corporate Governance Code.
Finally, it should be added that, if present, the Auditor too will appreciate the 
setting up of an effective Internal Control and Risk Management System as it will 
allow them to reduce detailed analyses by relying mainly on walk through proce-
dures and consistency checks for the pursuit of their objectives.
6. Monitoring ESG risks in SMEs
It is worth noting that in October 2018 the Committee of Sponsoring 
Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO) developed, in collaboration 
with the World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD), the 
guidelines “Environmental, Social & Governance - Enterprise Risk Management. 
Applying enterprise risk management to environmental, social and gover-
nance related risks” for the application of Enterprise Risk Management also to 
Environmental, Social & Governance risks (hereinafter “ESG risks”).
ESG risks concern the following issues: environmental, such as climate change, 
pollution and the protection of natural resources; social, such as the defence of 
human rights and working conditions or relations with local communities; gover-
nance, such as remuneration policies, the composition of the board of directors, 
control procedures and conduct in terms of compliance with laws and ethics.
In recent years, media and investor attention on environmental and social issues 
has increased considerably, making it more and more important to manage these 
risks, also in view of increasingly ESG-oriented national and international legisla-
tion. Institutional investors themselves are showing increasing interest in respon-
sible investment and the way companies are addressing social and environmental 
changes to achieve long-term, sustainable growth. ESG has also been addressed at 
the regulatory level. This is the framework of Legislative Decree 254/2016 which, 
by introducing “non-financial reporting”, requires, albeit currently only for large, 
listed companies, to disclose annually, among other aspects, risks and policies 
adopted in the environmental, social, personnel, human rights and anti-corruption 
fields. It is our opinion that the spread of a general and shared focus on these issues 
is set to bring them into SMEs reporting and language. The process of integrat-
ing ESG issues into these settings will probably be more gradual and, as usual, at 
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the beginning acting on a voluntary basis by following the reference benchmark 
represented by listed companies.
However, the increasing disclosure of ESG issues highlights the lower attention 
recognized to ESG risk management, even in larger companies, compared to the 
concern with more checked out operational, strategic and financial risks.
According to the World Business Council for Sustainable Development 
(WBCSD), the main reasons for this are: i- the difficulty in quantifying ESG risks in 
monetary terms, as they are long-term risks with uncertain impacts; ii- the lack of 
knowledge of the ESG risks which characterise a company and the scarcity of cross-
functional collaboration between the risk manager and those dealing with sustain-
ability; iii- the fact that ESG risks are often managed by a team of specialists and seen 
as separate or at least less important than strategic, operational and financial risks.
The COSO [24] and WBCSD Guidelines therefore propose the redesign of the 
following specific objectives:
a. Governance & Culture: increase the Board’s and management’s awareness of 
ESG issues, promoting a culture of collaboration across functions;
b. Strategy & Objective: anticipate short, medium and long-term ESG risks 
already in the business strategy and objectives definition phase;
c. Performance: identify and assess ESG risk and related treatment measures 
based on risk severity;
d. Review & Revision: develop indicators to alert management to changes that 
impact on risks and treatment measures;
e. Information, Communication & Reporting: identify the information to 
be communicated internally and externally, involving every level of the 
organisation.
It is our opinion that these are valuable indications necessary for an effective 
assessment of business viability. They can therefore be addressed when SMEs are 
called upon to implement new or renewed internal control and risk management 
systems to take account of the IC-Code indications. It is worth noting that the 
Italian Organism Business Reporting (OIBR) has recently set up a Study Group to 
assess the inclusion of non-financial indicators, including ESG, in the parameters 
for assessing and identifying corporate crises for early-warning purposes provided 
for by the IC-Code.
7. Risk of overlapping and possible remedies
To be efficient and effective, the system of controls and their distribution among 
the various players that make it up, with different roles, functions and responsibili-
ties, must necessarily reduce areas of overlaps and systematically structure the 
methods of interaction between the various players involved. The control functions 
can be described by identifying three different levels of subdivision:
1. First level controls – these manage and define the “line” controls of the opera-
tional processes, i.e. the checks carried out both by those who perform a given 
activity, and by those who have direct supervisory responsibility for it: in other 
words, these are the analytical accounting, management, budgeting, planning 
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and reporting systems that allow the administration and control of the  
business activities;
2. Second level controls, which monitor the correct conduct of the risk assessment 
and control process put into place by management, ensuring consistency with 
corporate goals and meeting organisational segregation criteria sufficient to 
allow effective monitoring;
3. Third level controls, whose goal is to assess the overall functionality of the  
company’s internal control system.
It is precisely on the latter that the activities of the parties mentioned in the pre-
vious paragraphs are concentrated. Polycentric control systems, like those described, 
present areas for improvement, but overlapping is a risk that, like other risks, must 
be monitored, can be reduced and, in some cases, can be an opportunity. This objec-
tive can and must be pursued by means of instruments necessarily operating ex-ante 
and involving all the bodies involved, which are asked to pay specific attention and 
be aware of potential issues and of the need/opportunity to manage them.
The following tools can be used:
• the definition of a language common to the general internal control system and 
risk management;
• the definition and adoption of harmonized methodologies and instruments;
• the integrated planning of activities seeking to limit redundancies and duplica-
tion, focusing on areas of greater complexity or risk;
• the management of the company in line with the objectives defined by the 
Board of Directors, fostering the taking of fully informed decisions, based on 
the awareness of risks and the necessary safeguards for their monitoring.
As far as control roles and functions are concerned, integration can only be 
achieved with the establishment of procedures that facilitate an in-depth exchange 
of information between the various players and the planning of an integrated 
activities plan. The text of 2020 Italian Corporate Governance Code is also working 
in this direction, taking an important step forward. On the one hand, the document 
stresses the centrality of the Board of Directors as the entity responsible for the 
internal control and risk management system. On the other hand, it goes further 
by recognising the need for structured coordination between the various parties 
involved to avoid inefficiencies and duplications. This implies to formulate and set 
up procedures that allow periodic and systematic exchanges of information among 
all the parties involved in various capacities and tasks in the system.
Recommendation included in the 2020 Italian Corporate Governance Code for 
listed companies and those aiming to be listed represent a relevant benchmark for 
all companies, regardless of their size, called to comply in the next future with the 
IC-Code.
8. Results, limits and further researches
The work has proposed an examination of the “Italian way” to face Family SMEs 
financial distress situations. As described it is characterized by the introduction 
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of the Board of Statutory Auditors which has a central role in identifying possible 
hazards to business viability. Its control ex-ante, as a matter of fact, allows the 
independent professionals involved in this special Board to interact in time with 
Directors - which in Family SMEs are usually are Family members - detecting signal 
of crisis and helping them to become aware of their relevance and potential impact. 
It is therefore asked to family SMEs to walk through this new path albeit imple-
menting tools proportionate to the company’s complexity. The aim is the develop-
ment of a full awareness of corporate risks, the construction of a map that identifies 
and explicitly represents them so that they can be brought to the Family members 
attention and can be better monitored.
The importance of a constant constructive dialogue between experienced 
independent professionals and family members involved in the management of 
the company has been highlighted. The more the dialogue takes place before and 
when the decisions are taken the more the possibility of a positive influence will 
be high and therefore the more the probability of taking risks unknowingly will be 
reduced. For this to be possible, however, it is necessary on one side that indepen-
dent professionals are able to use a convincing language and on the other side that 
family members are willing to listen their voices without feeling subjected to their 
presence. Experts ability to bring value, by focusing attention to the critical issues 
of choices and therefore forcing deeper and more rational reflections by tracing 
the intuition to a more structured and complex decision-making grid need to be 
recognized in the field.
Another point which resulted here emphasized is the necessity, when different 
control roles are defined, to reduce areas of overlaps and systematically structure 
the methods of interaction between the various players involved. This is essential 
to be able to convey clear and consistent messages and finally to reach efficacy of 
controls themselves. It is a relevant consideration as the proper operation of the 
Internal Control (IC) and Risk Management System (IC and ERM) involves, as seen 
in details in the chapter, several entities of corporate governance and consequently a 
risk is structural due to the increase of the complexity to manage.
A first limit of the work can be considered the qualitative approach of the analy-
sis. Indeed this is a descriptive work that aims to provide a first analysis of the new 
Italian legislation that will come into force on 1st September 2021. It will be possible 
in the very near future to verify whether what is here described will actually bring 
benefits to Family SMEs. It will be possible to collect data and to proceed with the 
measurement of the effects of the introduction of the mechanisms examined, in 
particular of the Statutory Board, on the ability to promptly intervene and avoid or 
at least to face situations of financial economic distress at an earlier stage.
A second limit could be considered the lack of explicit international compari-
sons. In this regard, however, it should be reported that the researches carried out 
has allowed to detect that no similar mechanisms have been introduced in other 
Western countries. It will be therefore interesting, in future researches, to widen 
and to go deeper with this part of the analysis. In particular it will be certainly 
necessary to consider, with reference to the European context, if the implementa-
tion of the EU Insolvency Directive, which emphasizes the need to provide early 
warning tools in national legislation, will lead in the near future to the introduction 
of corporate governance rules comparable to the Italian ones.
Moreover the work highlights that the “Italian way” introduced by the IC-Code 
provides some financial specific indexes to be monitored by both the Directors and 
the Statutory Board, but some non-financial information are also taken in consider-
ation. Some of these can be considered forward-looking and can be traced back to 
the categories of Governance information. It is our opinion that monitoring a more 
complete ESG information dataset could have an effective assessment of business 
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viability. Future research could explore the possible inclusion of non-financial 
indicators, including ESG, in the parameters to identify corporate crises for early-
warning purposes provided for by the IC-Code.
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